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Abstract 
 
In ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, Hume brought forward famous “Fact/Value” 
Question, which demanded people illuminate whether value judgment can be rationally 
derived from fact judgment. Since the 20th century, by the method of linguistic analysis, 
western metaethical moralists have illuminated the m anings and logistic characters of 
value language, especially moral language, and basing on each point of views, afforded 
their own solutions to the “Fact/Value” Question which puzzled people for a long time. 
There are three main schools in Metaethics, Cognitivism, Non-cognitivism and Descriptivism. 
Cognitivism can also be divided into Naturalism and Intuitionism. By “naturalistic 
definition”, naturalists joint moral judgment and fact judgment together logically. But intuitionists 
argue against all kinds of naturalistic definitions and illuminate that basic value words which 
figure a kind of non-natural property can not be defined and people, without the cognition of fact, 
make moral judgment directly by “intuition”. Non-cognitivism considers that value judgments 
have some special function which can not be possessed by fact judgment, expressing emotion, 
evaluating things, prescribing people’s choice of actions and so on. Therefore, people usually 
make value judgments by emotion, will and decision. A d fact judgment can not educe value 
judgment rationally without these factors. Among descriptivists, some of them think that during 
the formation of value judgment, the factual cognitio s on things and actions play more decisive 
role than those subjective emotion and will, so fact judgment can educe value judgment rationally. 
Some of them think that the meaning of many words in icate that “fact” and “value” can not be 
divided and they enlace one another. The others declare directly that the dichotomy of “fact” and 
“value” has collapsed. 
On the base of linguistic analysis, although western metaethical moralists bring forward 
many key factors, “definition”, “intuition”, “emotion”, “will” and “meaning”, to explain 
whether people can derive “value” from “fact” rationally. However, we can still question 
more closely where these key factors come from and how people get words’ “definition” 
and “meaning”. We think that western metaethical moralists can not solve the questions 
above faultlessly by linguistic analysis. So their answers to “Fact/Value” Question are not 















shows that we should break through the path of linguistic analysis and pay attention to a kind 
of theory which historically, realistically and critically reflects on people’s language and 
consciousness. The theory can investigate people’s realistic life, explore why people can derive 
value judgment from fact judgment according to the research on the people’s practice of 
creating “value” and explain the problems above that western mataethics can not solve, 
which leads our visual field from western Metaethics to Marxism. 
To explore Marxism’s answer to “Fact/Value” Question, first of all, we consider 
searching Marxist text from which to analyze Marxist’s theory. But we take Analytical 
Marxism as an example to show that if we only research on Marxist text, cling to 
analyzing language and ignore the history and reality, then on the one hand, this kind of 
method has already violated Marxism’s basic demands, on the other hand, because they 
could persist on dialectics and historical materialism, they educed three different answers to the 
question whether Marxism derive “value” from “fact”, which puzzled people. 
So on the base of the analysis of Analytical Marxism’s limitation and revelation, we 
refer to Marxist text, start from the realistic history and seek the answer from the research 
on the people’s historical practice of creating “value”. We thus draw this conclusion that 
in the real life, drived by their needs, people engage to produce and labor for manufactures 
that can satisfying their needs, during which they form relation of cognition and 
reconstruction to nature and relation of production a d many other social relations 
depending on it, and at last according to judging whether these manufactures satisfying 
their needs or not, they denominate the manufacture that satisfying their needs and action 
they take to produce it to be valuable. Along with taking this kind of production and labor 
again and again, people gradually realize that the manufacture which has certain factual 
characters and the action they take to produce it always valuable, so without taking 
realistic practice, they can say that they have value characters B because things and 
actions have certain factual characters A, which is so-called deriving value judgment from 
fact judgment. 
Finally, we think that, western metaethical moralists indeed open out the essential 
characters of value language widely used by us and every school among them can partly 















by researching on people’s practice of creating “value”, we think that “definition”, 
“intuition”, “emotion”, “will”, “meaning” and so on used by western metaethical moralists 
to solve “Fact/Value” Question are not arising without foundation today and the formation 
of value judgment and the deduction from fact judgment to value judgment that can realize 
today are all experiencing a perennial process. all above have their own historical realistic 
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    西方元伦理学中第一个值得注意的流派是自然主义
①
。自然主义首先是将道






































































































                                                   
① 赵林. 西方哲学史讲演录[M]. 北京：高等教育出版社，2009：42. 
② 赵林. 西方哲学史讲演录[M]. 北京：高等教育出版社，2009：42. 













Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database”. Full
texts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit
requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn for delivery details.
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
